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A ONE-TWo PUNCH TO FORUM SHOPPING: RECENT JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE
AMENDMENTS TO SOUTH CAROLINA'S CORPORATE VENUE JURISPRUDENCE

I.

INTRODUCTION

Hampton County is notorious throughout South Carolina, and the nation, for
its plaintiff-friendlyjurors and excessive verdicts.' Predictably, plaintiffs frequently
search for any potential justification to file their complaints in Hampton County
courts. Unfortunately for corporate defendants, plaintiffs have rarely come up
empty handed. South Carolina's pre-2005 venue statute and its judicial
interpretation failed to provide any rational limitations to corporate venue.2 Prior
to 2005, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in an attempt to resolve inherent
ambiguities in the pre-2005 venue statute, erroneously relied on language from the
service of process statute 3 to formulate an overly broad definition of corporate
residence.4 Consequently, the court determined that corporations reside, for venue
purposes, in any county where they merely own property and transact business.5 In
addition, the pre-2005 venue statute allowed plaintiffs to sue certain foreign
corporations "in any county which the plaintiff shall designate in his complaint."6
As a result, Hampton County experienced a forty-three percent increase between
2000 and 2004 in the number of lawsuits filed in its courts.' Furthermore, Hampton
County currently maintains a caseload nearly twice that of other counties with
comparable populations. 8 Consequently, Hampton County epitomizes the
significant problems associated with forum shopping under South Carolina's pre2005 venue jurisprudence.
South Carolina courts and lawmakers recently delivered a one-two punch that
effectively eliminates forum shopping within the state. On February 2, 2005, the
South Carolina Supreme Court struck first with its ground-breaking decision in
Whaley v. CSX Transportation,Inc.9 In Whaley, the supreme court overturned
several previous cases and held that "own[ing] property and transact[ing] business"
within a county is insufficient to establish the residence of a corporate defendant
1. See Press Release, Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, SC Supreme Court Decision Should Reduce Forum
Shopping in Third Worst I (Feb. 3, 2005), http://www.atra.org/show/7862 (stating that Hampton
County is "the third worst jurisdiction in the United States for issuing plaintiff-friendly verdicts");
Michael Freedman, Home Court Advantage, FORBES, June 10, 2002, at 75, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/0610/074.hul (discussing a medical malpractice case where a
Hampton County jury issued a verdict thirteen times above the national average).

2. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (2005) (amended 2005).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-210 (2005).

4. See In re Asbestosis Cases, 274 S.C. 421,426-27, 266 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1980).
5. Id. at 426, 266 S.E.2d at 775.

6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (2005) (amended 2005).
7. AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, at 22 (2004), http://www.atra.org/
reports/helholes/2004/hellholes2004.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL HELLHOLES].
8. Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 5-6,
Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 609 S.E.2d 286 (2005) (No. 01-CP-25-127) [hereinafter
Amicus Brief of Product Liability Council].
9. 362 S.C. 456, 609 S.E.2d 286 (2005).
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for venue purposes.' Subsequently, the South Carolina Legislature passed
"sweeping tort reform legislation... that included the first significant changes to
the state's general venue statute in over a century."" The Economic Development,
Citizens, and Small Business Protection Act of 2005,12 which became effective on
July 1, 2005, includes a much-needed amendment to South Carolina's archaic
venue statute.' 3 Together, these recent changes in South Carolina's corporate venue
jurisprudence have established overdue limitations on forum selection that more
adequately protect the substantive rights of corporate defendants and promote the
convenience of all interested parties.
Part II of this Comment provides essential background information concerning
the historical development of venue law and the justifications for establishing
statutory venue limitations. Part III explores the evolution of South Carolina's
previous corporate venue jurisprudence and discusses the adverse effects caused by
the state's failure to establish adequate restrictions on forum selection. Part IV
examines the South Carolina Supreme Court's recent opinion in Whaley and
further analyzes the subsequent effects of this landmark decision. Part V considers
the changes in the amended version of South Carolina Code section 15-7-30 and
examines its application to corporate venue. Finally, Part VI analyzes the potential
widespread effects of the recent changes to South Carolina's corporate venue
jurisprudence.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF VENUE JURISPRUDENCE

A.

The HistoricalDevelopment of Venue

The concept of venue originally developed in the early English judicial
system. 4 Historically, the King traveled throughout the country and held court at
various locations based entirely upon his own convenience." However, the records
and equipment soon became "too bulky," influencing the court to settle at
Westminister. 6 Once settled, the court summoned jurors to Westminster for trial, 7
and venue took on the meaning of "the locality from which jurors were selected."'"
At that time, jurors participated extensively in the questioning of litigants-a

10. Id. at 474-75, 609 S.E.2d at 295-96.
11. Daniel B. White, et al., Where Do We Go From Here? Recent Changes in South Carolina's
Venue Laws, S.C. LAW., May 2005, at 27, 30.
12. Economic Development, Citizens, and Small Business Protection Act of 2005, No. 27, §§ 3-4,
2005 S.C. Acts 107 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-7-30 & -100 (Supp. 2005)).
13. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (2005) (amended 2005), S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (Supp.
2005).
14. Steven Rineberg, Comment, Twisted Currents: Navigating through Corporate Venue in
Missouri and the Quest to Simplify Its Construction, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1055, 1064 (2001).
15. William Wirt Blume, Place of Trialof Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1949).
16. Id. at 3.
17. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.23 (4th ed. 1992) (citing Blume, supranote
15, at 7-8).

18. Rineberg, supra note 14, at 1064.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss3/5

2

McFarland: A One-Two Punch to Forum Shopping: Recent Judicial and Legislativ

20063

CIVIL PROCEDURE

process that worked more efficiently if the jurors were familiar with the location of
the dispute. 9
As the legal system developed and the role of jurors declined, the focus of
venue correspondingly shifted from the location of the dispute and from where
2
jurors were drawn to "the distinction between transitory and local actions. 1
Generally, local actions involved disputes that could occur only in a particular
location, such as disputes over real property.2 ' Therefore, plaintiffs could bring
local actions only "where the cause of action arose. 22 In contrast, tort actions were
generally transitory in nature because the alleged act or omission giving rise to the
cause of action might have occurred anywhere.23 Absent any statutory requirement
limiting venue, tort actions "[could] be maintained wherever the wrongdoer [could]
be found and legally served with process."' Today, the majority of jurisdictions
have enacted statutes that provide the exclusive regulation of venue.25
Consequently, the modem definition of venue has evolved into "[t]he proper or a
possible place for a lawsuit to proceed, [usually] because the place has some
connection either with the events that gave rise to the lawsuit or with the plaintiff
or defendant."26
B. Justificationsfor Venue Restrictions
Venue statutes limit the number of available fora and protect the competing
interests in the location of trial. Undeniably, venue is a critical aspect of civil
litigation that can significantly affect the resolution of a dispute. 27 The forum of
adjudication often affects the "geographic location, pleading and discovery rules,
docket speed, judge assignment, and jury pool.2" Under the American judicial
system, a plaintiff is the "master of its complaint" and initially selects the forum in
which to adjudicate its claim. 29 Therefore, absent any restrictions, plaintiffs can
designate a venue merely for its strategic advantages without consideration of
competing, yet valid, interests.30 The concept of venue primarily serves to promote

19. Id.
20. Id.; see also 77 AM. JUR. 2d Venue § 2 (1997) ("Under the common law, the venue of an

action depended upon whether the action was local or transitory in nature." (citing Little v. Chicago,
St. P. M.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

& Ry. Co., 67 N.W. 846, 846-47 (Minn. 1896))).
JAMES F. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 625 (2d ed. 1996).
Id.
77 AM. JuR. 2D Venue § 25 (1997).
Id.
Id. § 2.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1591 (8th ed. 2004).

27. See Gregory J. Swain, Annotation, Place Where Corporation is DoingBusinessforPurposes
ofState Venue Statute, 42 A.L.R.5th 221 (1996) (stating "venue can be a critical selection for litigants").
28. Rachel M. Janutis, Pulling Venue up By Its Own Bootstraps: The Relationship Among
Nationwide Service of Process,PersonalJurisdiction,and § 1391(c), 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 37, 39

(2004).
29. Id. at 38.
30. Id. at 39.
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the convenience of all parties, 3 not merely the self-serving motives of eager
plaintiffs. Consequently, courts, legislatures, and legal scholars have recognized
several justifications for establishing statutes that restrict plaintiffs' forum selection
alternatives.
The most debated and publicized justification for venue limitations is the
prevention of forum shopping. Forum shopping is "[t]he practice of choosing the
most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard."32 Without
venue restrictions, plaintiffs would possess unfettered discretion to select venue and
choose the most advantageous forum in which to adjudicate their claims.33
However, "flexibility so great that it encourages forum-shopping cannot be in the
best interests of any of the litigants."34 Although plaintiffs possess a significant
interest in selecting favorable courts, forum shopping blatantly disregards the valid
and often competing interests of other relevant parties. Those competing interests
include the convenience of the witnesses and other parties, judicial economy,
fairness to the local community, and substantive rights of defendants to be tried
where they reside.35 Forum shopping also "creates the impression that law and
jurors can be manipulated to give unfair advantages to certain parties" and therefore
reduces the public's confidence in the legal system.36 Consequently, the system
needs venue restrictions to balance all competing interests and "curb 'the abuses
engendered by this [overly] extensive venue.""'
Statutes limiting venue selection also promote the efficient allocation of
judicial resources and the expeditious resolution ofcivil actions.3" Without adequate
restrictions, plaintiff-friendly fora can experience a flood of litigation lacking any
significant relationship to that particular locality.39 The resulting congestion
prevents the affected courts from expeditiously resolving disputes, while other, less
strategically advantageous courts remain unnecessarily idle.' Moreover, judicial
proceedings undeniably progress more efficiently when conducted in a forum
having a more significant relationship to the underlying dispute. Courts in close
proximity to the dispute or the parties' residences can obtain easier access to

31. 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3801 (2d ed. 1986).
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 681 (8th ed. 2004).
33. Janutis, supra note 28, at 39.
34.

PAUL LAXALT ET AL., NAT'L LEGAL CTR. FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, VENUE AT THE

CROssROADs 20 (Steven R. Schlesinger ed., 1982).
35. Janutis, supra note 28, at 39-40.
36. Amicus Brief of Product Liability Council, supra note 8, at 25.
37. Janutis, supra note 28, at 39 (quoting WRIGHT, supra note 31, § 3802).
38. Id.
39. See Amicus Brief of Product Liability Council, supra note 8, at 6 (stating that prior to 2005
Hampton County had a caseload almost twice that of other counties with similar populations); JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES, supra note 7, at 21 (stating that in 2002, sixty-seven percent of lawsuits in Hampton
County were filed by non-residents, and forty-one percent concerned events that occurred elsewhere).
40. See LAXALT ET AL., supra note 34, at 15 (asserting that forum shopping causes congestion in

courts).
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evidence and witnesses." In addition, "[k]nowledge of local customs, influences,
conditions and history facilitates expeditious and intelligent handling of the case."42
Furthermore, venue restrictions shield local communities from injustices
associated with forum shopping and promote the interests of local residents."3
Insufficient venue limitations allow plaintiffs to bring civil claims in distant courts,
thereby forcing those courts to entertain unrelated litigation. Forum shopping thus
unfairly imposes litigation expenses and jury duty on local communities "which
ha[ve] no real interest in the outcome of the suit."' Moreover, the public has a
considerable interest in monitoring significant local events.4 Legal events
frequently have substantial consequences for the local community, and are of great
concern to local residents. In addition, adjudicating disputes locally enhances the
opportunity for interested parties to receive notice of the proceedings and to
intervene when necessary."
Most importantly, venue limitations protect defendants, especially corporations
and other business entities, from being forced to litigate in distant and inconvenient
fora.47 South Carolina courts have long recognized "the right of a defendant to be
tried in the county of his residence is a substantial one and [is] not to be lightly
denied."4 Indeed, the plaintiff's right of forum selection is inferior to the
defendant's right to be tried in the locality where it resides.4 Although this right is
equally applicable to all defendants, it presents unique implications for corporate
defendants. Unlike the residence of an individual, the residence of a corporation is
frequently difficult to ascertain and is more susceptible to broad interpretation."
Therefore, effective venue limitations prevent over-inclusive determinations of
corporate residence and restrict plaintiffs from hauling corporate defendants into
"inconvenient or burdensome" fora."'

41. Id. at 26-27.
42. Id. at 27.

43. Janutis, supranote 28, at 39-40.
44. LAXALT ET AL., supra note 34, at 15.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 26.

47. Rineberg, supranote 14, at 1065.
48. Carroll v. Guess, 302 S.C. 175, 177, 394 S.E.2d 707,706 (1990); see also Blizzard v. Miller,
306 S.C. 373, 375, 412 S.E.2d 406, 407 (1991) (stating that defendants have a "substantial right" to be
tried where they reside); Rogers v. Montgomery, 188 S.C. 244,247, 198 S.E. 380, 381 (1938) (asserting
that the right of defendants to be tried where they reside is a substantial right (citing Rosamond v.
Lucas-Kidd Motor Co., Inc., 183 S.C. 544, 550, 191 S.E. 516, 518 (1937))).
49. Carroll,302 S.C. at 177, 394 S.E.2d at 708.
50. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939) (stating the
procedural concepts underlying venue pose more significant problems when applied to corporations
than to individuals).
51. Janutis, supra note 28, at 37; see also Rineberg, supra note 14, at 1065 (stating that venue
statutes serve to "protect defendants from being haled into distant courts" (quoting Alan J. Lazarus,
Jurisdiction,Venue, and Service ofProcessIssues in LitigationInvolving a ForeignParty,31 TORT &

INs. L.J. 29, 66-67 (1998))).
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S PRE-2005 CORPORATE VENUE
JURISPRUDENCE

South Carolina's pre-2005 venue jurisprudence contained inadequate
limitations on corporate venue and failed to protect the interests of corporate
defendants, local courts, and the public in general. The venue statute, South
Carolina Code section 15-7-30, provided the basis for forum selection:
[T]he action shall be tried in the county in which the defendant
resides at the time of the commencement of the action. If there be
more than one defendant then the action may be tried in any
county in which one or more of the defendants to such action
resides at the time of the commencement of the action. If none of
the parties shall reside in the State the action may be tried in2 any
county which the plaintiffshall designate in his complaint.1
The inherent ambiguity and overly broad nature of the statute led to unfairness and
inefficiency in its application, especially for corporate defendants.
A.

Residence of CorporateDefendantsfor Venue Purposes

The venue statute's first major deficiency involved its ambiguous reference to
the residence of corporate defendants. Although the statute expressly established
venue "in the county in which the defendant resides," it failed to define or provide
any basis for determining a defendant's residence. 3 This ambiguity proved
troublesome, particularly for corporations, whose residence is inherently more
difficult to ascertain than that of individuals. 4 Early South Carolina Supreme Court
decisions circumvented the venue statute's shortcomings by establishing practical
and restrictive definitions of corporate residence."5 Initially, the supreme court
established different definitions of "resides" for domestic and foreign corporations.
A domestic corporation's residence for venue purposes was "(1) in any county
where the corporation maintain[ed] an agent and transact[ed] its corporate business
or (2) in the county where the corporation maintained its principal place of

52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (2005) (amended 2005) (emphasis added). This section governs
venue for all civil actions filed in South Carolina with several narrow exceptions. For these specific
exceptions, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-10 (2005) (governing venue for actions involving real property)
and S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-20 (2005) (governing actions for recovery of statutory penalties and
forfeitures, and actions against public officers in the execution of their duties).
53. Id. § 15-7-30.

54. See Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 168 (stating the procedural concepts underlying venue pose more
significant problems when applied to corporations than to individuals).
55. For a list of early South Carolina cases establishing practical venue limitations, see Whaley
v. CSX Transp. Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 468, 609 S.E.2d 286, 292 (2005).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss3/5

6

McFarland: A One-Two Punch to Forum Shopping: Recent Judicial and Legislativ
CIVIL PROCEDURE
2006]

business." 6 In contrast, "for purposes of venue, a foreign corporation reside[d] in
any county where it ha[d] an office and agent for the transaction of business.""
In Miller v. Boyle Construction Co.," the supreme court abandoned its
restrictive interpretation of the venue statute and substantially expanded the
definition of "resides" for domestic corporations. In Miller, the court held that in
addition to the counties meeting the tests above, domestic corporations also resided
in any counties where they owned property and transacted business. 9 The court
relied exclusively on a 1927 statute that governed service of process and personal
jurisdiction over domestic corporations.6 ° The statute stated that "'service... shall
be effective and confer jurisdiction over any domestic corporationin any County
6 The
where such domestic corporation shall own propertyand transactbusiness.""'
court failed to provide any justification for its reliance on the service of process
statute, merely stating that the statute "also governed and controlled" venue.62
Consequently, by interpreting the service of process statute as complementary to
the venue provision, the Miller court substantially broadened the definition of
"resides" for domestic corporations.
Initially, the supreme court refused to extend the definition of "resides" in a
similar fashion for foreign corporations. Six years after Miller, the supreme court
in Hancock v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.63 reasoned the 1927 service of process
statute failed to make even "the slightest inference or reference to a domesticated
foreign corporation."' Therefore, the court declined to extend the reasoning of
Miller to foreign corporations and maintained the previous venue standard for those
corporations.6 However, in 1964, the legislature amended the service of process
statute to include foreign corporations." The amended statute stated that "service
as effected under the terms of this section shall be effective and confer jurisdiction
over any domestic orforeign corporation in any county where such domestic or
foreign corporationshall own property and transactbusiness."67' Soon afterward,
the supreme court in Lott v. Claussens,Inc.6' extended Miller's reasoning to foreign
corporations.69 The court in Lott thus determined that a foreign corporation also
resided for venue purposes in any county where it "'own[ed] property and
56. Id. at 468, 609 S.E.2d at 292 (citing McGrath v. Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co., 74 S.C. 69, 71-72,
54 S.E. 218, 218-29 (1906)).
57. Id. at 468, 609 S.E.2d at 292 (citing Sanders v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 235 S.C. 259, 265,
111 S.E.2d 201, 203-04 (1959)).
58. 198 S.C. 166, 172, 17 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1941).
59. Id. at 172, 17 S.E.2d at 314.
60. Id. at 172, 17 S.E.2d at 314.
61. Id. at 172, 17 S.E.2d at 314 (emphasis added) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 434 (1932)).
62. Id. at 172, 17 S.E.2d at 314.
63. 211 S.C. 432, 439, 45 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1947).
64. Id. at 439, 45 S.E.2d at 853.
65. Id. at 440-41, 45 S.E.2d at 853.
66. Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 470, 609 S.E.2d 286, 293 (2005).
67. Id. at 470, 609 S.E.2d at 293 (emphasis added) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-421 (Supp.

1964)).
68. 251 S.C. 478, 480, 163 S.E.2d 615, 616-17 (1968).
69. Id. at 480, 163 S.E.2d at 616-17 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-421 (Supp. 1964)).
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transact[ed] business. " 7 The court adopted a broad definition of"owning property"
for venue purposes.7 In probably the most egregious example of the over-extension
of corporate venue, the Lott court held that possessing intangible property rights of
a continuous and permanent
nature was sufficient to satisfy the "owns property"
72
requirement for venue.
In Lott, the plaintiff sued in Barnwell County, seeking damages stemming from
an automobile accident." On appeal, defendant Claussens challenged the verdict
on the basis of improper venue. Claussens, "a foreign corporation duly
domesticated in South Carolina [and] engaged in the bakery business," sold various
baked goods to grocery stores throughout Barnwell County.74 To assist in the
promotion and distribution of its products, Claussens joined the South Carolina
Bakers' Council. The Council owned bread racks in various grocery stores that it
provided to members to display their products. The Council initially paid for and
retained ownership of the racks, but Claussens later reimbursed the Council for its
total cost.7" Although Claussens was not in privity with any grocery stores in
Barnwell County, the court concluded that Claussens "acquired a valuable and
legally enforceable right" to use display racks throughout the county.76
Furthermore, because the right was permanent and continuous in nature, the court
determined that it constituted "owning property" for purposes of the venue test.77
The most documented decision summarizing South Carolina's pre-2005
corporate venue jurisprudence is In re Asbestosis Cases.7" Combining the holdings
of Miller and Lott, In re Asbestosis Cases definitively explained that the residence
of both foreign and domestic corporations for venue purposes included counties in
which they owned property and transacted business.79 The supreme court stated,

"where there are different statutes in pari materia, though enacted at different
times, and not referring to each other, they are to be taken and construed together
as one system, and as explanatory of each other."8 Applying this principle, the
court concluded the venue statute and the service of process statute "obviously deal
with the same general subject matter."'" Therefore, "venue would be proper under
the provisions of section 15-7-30, as augmented by [the service of process
statute]." 2 Thus, domestic corporations were subject to venue in any county where
they (1) maintained their "principal place of business," or (2) "maintain[ed] an

70. Id. at 480, 163 S.E.2d at 616-17.
71. Id. at 482, 163 S.E.2d at 618.
72. Id. at481-82, 163 S.E.2d at 617-18.
73. Id. at 480, 163 S.E.2d at 616.
74. Lott v. Claussens, Inc., 251 S.C. 478, 480-81, 163 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1968).
75. Id. at 481, 163 S.E.2d at 617.
76. Id. at 482, 163 S.E.2d at 617.
77. Id. at 482, 163 S.E.2d at 617-18.
78. 274 S.C. 421, 266 S.E.2d 773 (1980).
79. Id. at 426, 266 S.E.2d at 775.
80. Id. at 426, 266 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting Fishburne v. Fishburne, 171 S.C. 408, 410, 172 S.E.
426, 427 (1934)).
81. Id. at 426, 266 S.E.2d at 775.
82. Id. at 427, 266 S.E.2d at 775-76.
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office and agent for the transaction of business," or (3) "own[ed] property or
transact[ed] business." 3 Foreign corporations were subject to venue in any county
where they (1) "maintain[ed] an office and agent for the transaction of business,"
or (2) "own[ed] property or transacted business.""
B. Application of the Pre-2005 Venue Statute to CorporationsNot Residing
in Any South CarolinaCounty
In addition to being overbroad, South Carolina's previous venue statute was
facially deficient because it expressly gave plaintiffs unfettered discretion to select
venue regarding certain foreign corporations. As discussed above, the courts
determined that foreign corporations resided in any county where they (1)
"maintain[ed] an office and agent for the transaction of business" or (2) "own[ed]
property and transact[ed] business.""5 Under the above test, many foreign
corporations that operated within the state failed to reside in any South Carolina
county for venue purposes. In such scenarios, a provision of the pre-2005 venue
statute allowed "the action [to] be tried in any county which the plaintiff shall
designate in his complaint," 6 regardless of the location of the underlying dispute
or potential witnesses. This statutory provision failed to provide even the slightest
restriction on venue selection and thus permitted legislatively-sanctioned forum
shopping.8 7

C. Effects ofSouth Carolina'sPrevious CorporateVenue Methodology
South Carolina's pre-2005 venue statute and its judicial interpretation failed to
provide adequate limitations on corporate venue and thereby ignored substantial
competing interests in local adjudication. Both the broad interpretation of corporate
residence and the statute's application to non-resident corporations gave plaintiffs
broad discretion in selecting fora. By interpreting "resides" to include "owns
property and transacts business," ' the supreme court strayed from the plain

83. Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 472, 609 S.E.2d 286, 294 (2005) (quoting In re
Asbestosis Cases, 276 S.C. 579, 582, 281 S.E.2d 112, 114 (1981).

84. Id. at 472, 609 S.E.2d at 294 (quoting Asbestosis Cases, 276 S.C. at 582, 281 S.E.2d at 114).
85. Id. at 472, 609 S.E.2d at 294 (quoting Asbestosis Cases, 276 S.C. at 582, 281 S.E.2d at 114).
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (2005) (amended 2005).
87. When litigation simultaneously involved resident and non-resident corporate defendants,
South Carolina's pre-2005 venue statute expressly limited proper venue to counties in which the
domestic corporation resided. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized a preference for venues
appropriate for resident corporations over venues merely applicable to non-resident corporations.
FLANAGAN, supra note 21, at 623 (citing Asbestosis Cases at 426-33, 266 S.E.2d at 775-78).
88. See Asbestosis Cases, 276 S.C. at 582, 281 S.E.2d at 114.
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meaning of this term89 and deprived corporate defendants of their right to be tried
where they resided.
In addition, the unrestricted venue methodology disregarded the considerable
interests of local courts and communities. First, the overly-broad venue standards
exposed plaintiff-friendly courts to a flood of litigation lacking any real connection
to the forum county. As discussed earlier, Hampton County maintained a caseload
twice that of similarly-populated counties.90 Forty-one percent of those cases
concerned incidents occurring outside of the county.9 Consequently, South
Carolina's pre-2005 venue jurisprudence was damaging to judicial economy.
Plaintiffs also often filed complaints in fora lacking any reasonable relationship to
the underlying dispute, forcing disinterested local citizens to bear the burden of
remote litigation while truly interested citizens lost their ability to monitor the
proceedings.
IV.

CASTING THE FIRST STONE: AN ANALYSIS OF WHALEY V. CSXTRANSPORTA TION,

INC.

After twenty-five years of applying an overly-extensive interpretation of the
pre-2005 venue statute regarding corporate defendants, the South Carolina Supreme
Court finally changed directions in Whaley. " The Whaley court held that, for venue
purposes, owning property and transacting business within a county is insufficient
to establish that county as a residence for corporate defendants.93 In so holding, the
court reverted to the earlier definition of "resides" and limited proper venue over
foreign and domestic corporations to any county where "a defendant
corporation ...(1) maintains its principal place of business or (2) maintains an
'
office and agent for the transaction of business."94
In Whaley, CSX Transportation employed the plaintiff, Danny Whaley, as a
locomotive engineer."s On May 20, 2000, Whaley was traveling on his typical route
between Greenwood and Laurens, South Carolina, when he was overcome by
stomach cramps and nausea.96 After paramedics transported Whaley to the local
emergency room, a physician diagnosed him with heat exhaustion and
dehydration.97 After a failed attempt to return to work, Whaley discovered he was
unable to perspire when exerting himself, making it impossible for him to continue

89. See Webster's College Dictionary 1145 (1991) (defining "reside" as "to dwell permanently
or for a considerable time; live"); see also Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 178,
420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1992) (stating that "words used [in a statute] must be given their plain and

ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand its operation").
90. Amicus Brief of Product Liability Council, supra note 8, at 6.
91. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

7, at 21.
362 SC. 456, 609 S.E.2d 286 (2005).
Id. at 474, 609 S.E.2d at 295.
Id. at 475, 609 S.E.2d at 296.
Id. at 465, 609 S.E.2d at 290.
Id. at 465, 609 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. at 466, 609 S.E.2d at 291.
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in his job.98 Nearly three years later, Whaley began experiencing shortness of breath
and dizziness, prompting the installation of a pacemaker in his chest.9 9
Subsequently, Whaley filed a complaint against CSX in Hampton County, South
Carolina, alleging that CSX negligently failed to provide a safe working
environment.' 00
The facts relevant to venue indicated that Hampton County had no relationship
with the underlying dispute and a negligible connection to either party. CSX, a
foreign corporation existing under Virginia law, maintained its principal place of
business in Florida.'0 ' CSX neither operated any offices nor maintained agents for
the transaction of business in Hampton County. 2 The plaintiff also had no
apparent connection to Hampton County. Whaley's family had resided in Abbeville
County for nearly 250 years.0 3 Moreover, Whaley typically worked from a CSX
facility in Greenwood County, and the alleged incident did not occur in Hampton
County. 4 Consequently, locating the trial in Hampton County was inconvenient
for both parties. Although Greenwood County's court was only thirteen miles from
the plaintiff's home, "Whaley's lawyer filed [the] complaint six counties and 145
miles away in Hampton County, a jurisdiction generally perceived as favorable to
plaintiffs."'0 5 Moreover, no witnesses identified by either party lived in Hampton
County."° One witness for the plaintiff even admitted in his deposition that
conducting the trial in Hampton County would be inconvenient for him.'0 7
The trial court denied CSX's motion to transfer venue, "finding that CSX was
a resident of Hampton County because it owned property and transacted business
in Hampton county."' ' In particular, CSX owned railroad tracks throughout the
county and performed various hauling services for local businesses.'0 9 The trial
court also stated that CSX's "substantial and continuous contacts" within the
county further supported venue.' 0 Following a one-million-dollar verdict for Mr.

98. Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 466-67, 609 S.E.2d 286, 291 (2005).
99. Id. at 467, 609 S.E.2d at 291.
100. Id. at 467, 609 S.E.2d at 291.
101. Affidavit of Robert L. Love, Jr. at 1, Whaley, 362 S.C. 456, 609 S.E.2d 286 (No. 01-CP-25127).
102. Id.
103. Brief of The American Tort Reform Association et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 3, Whaley, 362 S.C. 456, 609 S.E.2d 286 (No. 01-CP-25-127) [hereinafter Amicus Brief
of ATRA].
104. Whaley, 362 S.C. at 465, 609 S.E.2d at 291; see also Affidavit of Robert L. Love, Jr., supra
note 101, at 1 (stating that "none of the alleged acts and/or omissions occurred in Hampton County").
105. Amicus Brief of ATRA, supra note 103, at 3.
106. Affidavit of Robert L. Love, Jr., supra note 101, at 2.
107. Deposition of John Holman at 28-29, Whaley, 362 S.C. 456,609 S.E.2d 286, No. 01-CP-25127.
108. Whaley, 362 S.C. at 473, 609 S.E.2d at 295.
109. See Affidavit of Robert L. Love, Jr., supra note 101, at 1 (stating that CSX owned tracks in
Hampton County); Transcript of Record at 5, Whaley, 362 S.C. 456, 609 S.E.2d 286, (No. 01-CP-25127) (stating that CSX provided services such as "hauling materials or dropping cars at local facilities"
in Hampton County).
110. Whaley, 362 S.C. at 473, 609 S.E.2d at 295.
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Whaley, CSX appealed the trial court's venue determination, and the supreme court
granted certiorari."' Subsequently, the supreme court reversed the trial court's
ruling and determined that "CSX [did] not reside in Hampton County for purposes
' 2
of venue, and therefore the case should not have been tried in Hampton County.""
In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court first held "the 'owns property and
transacts business' test is no longer a viable test for determining whether venue is
proper.""' 3 The test originated when prior opinions relied on language from a
service of process and personal jurisdiction statute to interpret the term "resides"
within the venue statute." 4 One of those decisions had recognized the statutory
construction principle that "[w]here there are different statutes in pari materia,
though enacted at different times, and not referring to each other, they are to be
taken and construed together as one system, and as explanatory of each other.""'
In pari materiarefers to principles dealing with similar subjects or "relating to the
same matter."".6 Thus, the pre-Whaley venue cases, without providing any
justification, presumed that personal jurisdiction and venue concerned the same
subject matter.
The court in Whaley determined that the doctrines of personal jurisdiction and
venue are not analogous, and that previous decisions incorrectly interpreted the
respective statutes as complementary. "' There are several distinctions between the
two. First, personal jurisdiction is a substantive right granted to a defendant and
grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," 8 while venue
is a procedural choice based entirely on the convenience of the parties. "' Second,
a motion alleging improper venue does not preserve the issue of personal
jurisdiction.' 0 Thus, "if the defendant merely challenges venue, without asserting
the affirmative defense of personal jurisdiction . . .then the defendant has

effectively consented to the district court's personal jurisdiction.' 2' Finally, a court
can obtain personal jurisdiction over a properly served defendant without having

111. Id. at 467, 609 S.E.2d at 291-92.
112. Id.at 484, 609 S.E.2d at 300-01.
113. Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 474, 609 S.E.2d 286, 295 (2005).
114. Id. at 474, 609 S.E.2d at 295.
115. In re Asbestosis Cases, 274 S.C. 421,426, 266 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1980) (quoting Fishbure
v. Fishbume, 171 S.C. 408, 410, 172 S.E. 426, 427 (1934)).
116. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004); see also Joiner v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 109,
536 S.E.2d 372, 375 (2000) (stating that "statutes dealing with the same subject matter are in pari
materia and must be construed together, if possible, to produce a single, harmonious result").
117. Whaley, 362 S.C. at 474, 609 S.E.2d at 295.
118. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[D]ue process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940))).
119. 77 AM. JuR. 2D Venue § 1 (1997).
120. K. Todd Butler, Appellate PracticeandProcedure,56 MERCER L. REv. 1185, 1192 (2005)
(quoting Palmer v. Braun, 376 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004)).
121. Id.
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proper venue over that defendant.122 Because jurisdiction and venue clearly address
different concepts, South Carolina courts should not interpret them jointly."2
The United States Supreme Court, applying a similar analysis to that of the
Whaley court, has refused to mesh the concept of venue with personal jurisdiction
principles. For example, in Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board24 the Court
specifically distinguished venue from personal jurisdiction. The Robertson Court
explained: "It is obvious that jurisdiction, in the sense of personal service within
a district where suit has been brought, does not dispense with the necessity of
proper venue. It is equally obvious that proper venue does not eliminate the
requisite of personal jurisdiction over the defendant."' 25 Many state courts follow
a similar line of reasoning.'26 In State ex rel. Pagliarav. Stussie,'27 the Missouri
Court of Appeals held the interpretation of "agent" in the state's venue statute
should not be governed by the definition of that term contained in the service of
process statute. 12 Consequently, the court refused to interpret the venue statute by
relying upon the service of process statute.' 29
The Whaley court buttressed its argument for invalidating the "owns property
and transacts business" test on the fact that there was no longer a statutory basis for
imposing the test. 3 ' In 1981, the South Carolina General Assembly amended the
service of process statute.' 3 ' The amended version, which applied only to domestic
corporations, read as follows:
(a) The registered agent appointed by any domestic corporation
shall be the agent of such corporation for service of any
process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be
served, and such service shall be binding upon the
corporation.
(b) Whenever a corporation shall fail to appoint or maintain a
registered agent in this State, or whenever its registered agent
cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered
office, the Secretary of State shall be an agent of such

122. Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 474, 609 S.E.2d 286, 295 (2005); see also
supra note 31, §3801 (declaring that if venue is improper, the action cannot be heard in that
court although jurisdiction exists).
123. Whaley, 362 S.C. at 474, 609 S.E.2d at 295.
124. 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
125. Id. at 623.
126. See Swain, supra note 27, at 236 (asserting that a minority of states equate venue principles
with the test for personal jurisdiction).
127. 549 S.W.2d 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
128. Id. at 903. The court determined the standard definition for agent, .'a person authorized by
WRIGHT,

another to act for him, one intrusted with another's business,"' sufficiently applied for purposes of
venue. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 85 (4th ed. 1968)). In contrast, the service of process
statute relied on the more restrictive definition of a general agent. Id.
129. Id.
130. Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 474, 609 S.E.2d 286, 295 (2005).
131. Id. at 472, 609 S.E.2d at 294.
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corporation upon whom any such process, notice, or demand
may be served.' 32
The amended statute omitted any mention of personal jurisdiction, and, more
importantly, removed any reference to the ownership of property and transaction
of business.' 33 Therefore, even if Whaley had not held that previous courts
incorrectly relied upon the previous service of process statute in creating the "owns
property and transacts business" test, the Whaley court concluded that no statutory
basis for the test remained after 1981
Although the Whaley decision was quickly superseded by legislation, it still has
a significant effect on South Carolina law. The supreme court decided Whaley on
February 2, 2005,'3 and the legislature did not enact the new venue statute until
July 1, 2005. 36 Therefore, Whaley governs venue for all civil actions filed during
that five-month interval. 37 Whaley's invalidation of the "owns property and
transacts business" test also substantially reduced the number of potential venue
options available to plaintiffs suing corporate defendants. The decision immediately
reduced the potential for forum shopping and provided better protection of a
corporate defendant's right to be tried in the county where it truly resides. However,
Whaley could potentially have an adverse effect on certain foreign corporations.
Because Whaley narrowed the definition of "resides" for venue purposes, fewer
foreign corporations will meet the residency requirements in South Carolina
counties. Therefore, during the five-month period in which Whaley controls venue,
more foreign corporations will qualify as non-residents and will be subject to the
pre-2005 statutory provision, allowing plaintiffs unfettered discretion to select a
county in which to sue non-resident foreign corporations.'38
V. THE KNOCK-OUT PUNCH: SOUTH CAROLINA'S NEW VENUE STATUTE

Several months after the supreme court decided Whaley, the South Carolina
Legislature amended section 15-7-30 of the South Carolina Code, eliminating the
pre-2005 venue statute's deficiencies and establishing adequate restrictions on

132. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-210 (Supp. 1981). This amended version only referred to domestic
corporations, but the legislature established a new statutory provision, S.C. CODE ANN. §15-9-240
(Supp. 1981), which dealt exclusively with foreign corporations.
133. Whaley, 362 S.C. at 472, 609 S.E.2d at 295. Whaley discusses S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-210
(Supp. 1981), but the companion provision regarding foreign corporations also removed any reference
to jurisdiction or the "owns property and transacts business" test. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-240
(Supp. 1981).
134. Whaley, 362 S.C. at 472, 609 S.E.2d at 295.
135. Id. at 456, 609 S.E.2d at 286.
136. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (2005).
137. White et al., supra note 11, at31.
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (2005) (amended 2005) (stating that "[i]f none of the parties shall
reside in the State the action may be tried in any county which the plaintiff shall designate in his
complaint" (emphasis added)).
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corporate venue.'39 The amended venue statute became effective on July 1, 2005,
as a part of the Economic Development, Citizens, and Small Business Protection
Act of 2005.' 4 Unlike the previous venue statute, the new section 15-7-30 provides
comprehensive definitions for all essential terms and more effectively promotes the
rights of corporate defendants and the convenience of all interested parties.
A.

Time Consideredto Determine ProperVenue

The first significant change enacted by the new venue statute concerns the time
period the courts consider when determining venue. The previous venue statute
based the determination of venue on circumstances existing "at the time of the
commencement of the action,"'' while the new statute bases the determination of
venue on circumstances existing "at the time the cause of action arose."' 42 Although
the change appears subtle, it can substantially affect both trial strategy and the
rights of corporate defendants. For instance, determining venue based on the
circumstances existing "at the time the cause of action arose"'143 can significantly

reduce post-incident maneuvering by both parties. The statute of limitations in
South Carolina for tort and contract actions is three years.'" Within that time
period, market and economic developments could influence corporate defendants
to reposition or expand the location of their business. By determining venue "at the
time the cause of action arose,"' 45 the new venue statute prevents plaintiffs from
waiting three years in hopes the corporate defendant will enter a plaintiff-friendly
venue. Moreover, the statutory change prevents corporate defendants from
attempting to avoid litigation in uninviting counties by withdrawing their presence
from those counties after a cause -ofaction arises.
However, in some situations, basing venue on the circumstances existing "at
the time the cause of action arose"'" could hinder a corporate defendant's right to
be tried in the county of its current residence. Many corporations may decide to
relocate their businesses due to various market forces within the three years
provided by the statute of limitations. In that scenario, venue would be proper in the
county where the defendant previously resided, but not in the county of its current
residence. As a result, plaintiffs could force corporate defendants into distant courts
having little or no connection with their current location.

139. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (Supp. 2005).
140. Act No.27, §§ 3-4, 2005 S.C. Acts 107 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 & -100
(Supp. 2005)).
141. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (2005) (amended 2005).
142. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30(C)(1), (D)(2), (E)(1), (F)(2), (G)(2) (Supp. 2005).
143. Id.
144. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (2005).
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30(C)(1), (D)(2), (E)(1), (F)(2), (G)(2) (Supp. 2005).
146. Id.
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B. Basesfor DeterminingProper Venue
The most significant modification to South Carolina's venue statute concerns
the bases upon which courts determine proper venue. The pre-2005 version of the
established venue in any county where a corporate defendant
venue statute
"resides."'' 47 In contrast, the amended statute provides specific, well-defined, and
limited bases for establishing proper venue for both foreign and domestic
corporations. 4 ' The amended statute establishes separate and distinct bases for
determining venue depending on the nature of the corporation.149 Consequently, the
new statutory provision cures the inherent ambiguity and over-breadth of the
previous venue statute and more effectively protects the rights of corporate
defendants.
1. Application to Domestic Corporations
As applied to domestic corporations, the new venue-statute limits the number
of available fora and effectively promotes the convenience of the parties. The
relevant portion of the statute states:
(E) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a domestic
corporation.., must be brought and tried in the county in which
the:

(1) corporation.., has its principal place of business at
the time the cause of action arose; or
(2) most substantial part of the alleged act or omission
giving rise to the cause of action occurred."'
Thus, the first basis upon which the new statute predicates proper venue is the
corporation's principal place of business. To avoid ambiguity, the new venue
statute expressly defines a corporation's principal place of business:
(10) "Principal place of business" means:
(a) the corporation's home office location within the
State from which the corporation's officers direct,
control, or coordinate its activities;
(b) the location of the corporation's manufacturing, sales,
or purchasing facility within the State if the corporation
does not have a home office within the State; or
(c) the location at which the majority of corporate
activity takes place if the corporation has multiple

147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (2005) (amended 2005).
148. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-7-30(A)(1)-(8), (E)-(G) (Supp. 2005).
149. Id. § 15-7-30(E)-(G).

150. Id. § 15-7-30(E).
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offices . . . located within the State if the corporation
does not have a home office within the State and has
more than one ... facility within the State. The following
factors may be considered when determining the location
at which the majority of corporate activity takes place:
(i) the number of employees located in any one
county;
(ii) the authority ofthe employees located in any
one county; or
(iii) the tangible corporate assets that exist in
any one county. 5'
The definition of "principal place of business" ensures a plaintiff cannot select
a forum for purely self-serving motives and deprive a domestic corporation of its
right to be tried where it resides. Although the statute provides three alternatives for
defining the "principal place of business," each subsequent alternative is predicated
on the non-existence of the preceding condition. For example, subsection (b)
defines "principal place of business" as "the location of the
corporation's.., facility within the State." '52 However, subsection (b) applies only
"if the corporation does not have a home office within the State."15 3 The vast
majority of domestic corporations, by definition, will maintain a home office within
South Carolina and will be subject to venue only in that county. Therefore, the
definition of "principal place of business" substantially limits plaintiffs' forum
options regarding domestic corporations.
Additionally, the new venue statute fundamentally adopts the Whaley holding,
thus providing a second layer of protection against forum shopping."' Subsection
H of the venue statute expressly declares that "[o]wning property and transacting
business in a county is insufficient in and of itself to establish the principal place
of business for a corporation for purposes of this section."'15 However, the statutory
defmition of principal place of business effectively precludes application of the
"owns property and transacts business" test, rendering subsection H technically
unnecessary. The state legislature therefore considered the Whaley rule sufficiently
essential to the fair administration ofjustice as to warrant codification. Moreover,
by expressly repealing the previous judicially-created test, the legislature has
avoided any potential for confusion in the application of the "principal place of
business" definition.
The new venue statute also allows a plaintiff to sue domestic corporations, as
well as individual defendants, in the county where the "most substantial part of the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. § 15-7-30(A)(10).
Id. § 15-7-30(A)(10)(b).
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30(H) (Supp. 2005).
Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2006

17

South Carolina
Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 5 [Vol. 57: 465
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

alleged act or omission giving rise to the cause of action occurred."' 56
Unfortunately, the statute provides no basis for determining where the most
substantial part of the underlying dispute transpired. 57 Naturally, plaintiffs and
defendants will often interpret the provision differently, which may result in
confusion and litigation. Nevertheless, the application of the phrase "most
substantial part" should be straightforward in most scenarios. The language
contemplates fora possessing a close relationship to the underlying dispute, and
therefore eliminates locations having only a minimal or remote connection to the
events. Consequently, fora selected under the new venue provision should better
promote the convenience of witnesses and the interests of local communities.
2. Application to Foreign Corporations Possessing a Certificate of
Authority
The bases for establishing venue in suits against foreign corporations "required
to possess and possessing a certificate of authority"' 8 are nearly identical to the
bases for establishing venue in suits against domestic corporations. The provision
controlling venue over foreign corporations with certificates of authority states:
(F) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a foreign
corporation required to possess and possessing a certificate of
authority under the provisions of Section 33-15-101 et
seq.... must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) most substantial part of the alleged act or omission
giving rise to the cause of action occurred; or
(2) foreign corporation . . . has its principal place of
business at the time the cause of action arose. 159

While the provisions concerning domestic and foreign corporations appear similar,
the application of the "principal place ofbusiness" test to foreign corporations will
differ substantially from the test's application to domestic businesses.' 60 Foreign
corporations are less likely to maintain a home office within South Carolina.
Therefore, the principal place of business for foreign corporations will typically be
where the corporation maintains a "manufacturing, sales, or purchasing facility."' 6
Additionally, the new venue statute provides detailed guidance for determining
which facility controls venue because many foreign corporations operate multiple
facilities within the state. When a corporation maintains several facilities, the
corporation's principal place of business is "the location at which the majority of

156. Id. § 15-7-30(C)(2), (D)(1), (E)(2), (F)(1), (G)(1).
157. Id. § 15-7-30(E)(2).
158. Id. § 15-7-30(F).

159. Id.
160. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30(A)(10) (Supp. 2005).
161. Id. § 15-7-30(A)(10)(b).
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corporate activity takes place."' 62 To avoid unnecessary complexity or ambiguity,
the statute provides three factors for courts to consider when making this
determination: "(i) the number of employees . . . ; (ii) the authority of the
'
employees ... ; or (iii) the tangible corporate assets that exist in each county."163

Undeniably, opposing litigants will likely dispute the application of the factors and
particularly the weight given to each. Nevertheless, the new venue statute still
provides more guidance and more practical limitations on corporate venue than the
pre-2005 venue statute. For example, by establishing venue in the county where
"the majority of corporate activity takes place,"' 164 the new statute should prohibit
plaintiffs from bringing suit in counties where foreign corporations maintain a
relatively minor presence.'6 5 Therefore, the amended provisions more effectively
protects the rights of corporate defendants to be tried in the county where they
reside.
Another noteworthy distinction between the statute's treatment of foreign
corporations possessing a certificate of authority and domestic corporations is the
order in which the statute lists the different options for determining proper venue.
Unlike the domestic corporations provision, the provision governing foreign
corporations possessing a certificate of authority places the "most substantial part
of the alleged act or omission" option before the "principal place of business"
option. 16 6 Although the statute provides no rationale for the difference, the change

itself indicates a legislative preference for establishing venue in suits against
foreign corporations where the underlying dispute occurred.
One potential explanation for the distinction lies in the inherent differences
between domestic and foreign corporations. The likelihood of foreign companies
maintaining a home office or residing in the traditional sense within South Carolina
is much less than that of domestic corporations. Consequently, foreign corporations
potentially have a diminished right to be tried in the county where they reside.
Therefore, favoring the county where the most substantial part of the underlying
incident occurred prioritizes the interests of local witnesses and communities ahead
of foreign corporations.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. § 15-7-30(A)(10)(c)(i)-(iii).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30(A)(10)(c) (Supp. 2005)
Id. § 15-7-30(E)-(F).
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3. Application to Foreign Corporations Lacking a Certificate of
Authority
The new venue statute distinguishes between foreign corporations that have a
certificate of authority and those that do not.167 The provision governing the latter
states:
(G) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a foreign
corporation, except aforeigncorporationdescribedin subsection
(F).. . must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) most substantial part of the alleged act or omission
giving rise to the cause of action occurred;
(2) plaintiff resides at the time the cause of action arose,
or if the plaintiff is a ... corporation,. .. at its principal
place of business at the time the cause of action arose; or
(3) foreign corporation . . . has its principal place of
68
business at the time the cause of action arose.1
Subsections (G)(1) and (G)(2) have the same implications-and application-as the
provision governing foreign corporations possessing a certificate of authority.
However, subsection G includes one noteworthy distinction. Unlike other foreign
corporations, those without a certificate of authority are subject to venue where an
individual plaintiff resides or where a corporate plaintiff maintains its principal
place of business. One explanation for the distinction is that South Carolina law
does not require foreign corporations to obtain certificates of authority if they
maintain a minor presence or transact minimal business in the state."69 For those
corporations, all South Carolina counties will likely be equally convenient-or
inconvenient-as potential fora for litigation. Furthermore, some foreign
corporations transact business in South Carolina without authorization, even though
they are required to obtain a certificate of authority. The statute thus reflects the
policy that corporations refusing to adhere to the laws of the state should also have
less protection under the laws of the state. Thus, in suits against foreign
corporations lacking a certificate of authority, the new venue statute appropriately
places a plaintiff's interest in a convenient forum ahead of a defendant's right to be
tried where it resides.

167. Id. §15-7-30(F), (G). Foreign corporations described in subsection (F) are those "required
to possess and possessing a certificate of authority." d. § 15-7-30(F). Since subsection (G) explicitly

applies to foreign corporations not covered by subsection (F), subsection (G) logically applies to foreign
corporations not required to possess or not possessing a certificate of authority.
168. Id. § 15-7-30(G) (emphasis added).
169. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-15-101 (1990) (listing exceptions to the certificate of authority
requirement).
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THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S NEW CORPORATE VENUE
METHODOLOGY

Corporations and legal professionals throughout South Carolina should not
underestimate the far-reaching effects of Whaley and the amended section 15-7-30.
In particular, the new venue statute has revamped the judicial landscape for civil
litigation involving corporate defendants. Although its full impact cannot be
immediately appreciated, the statute represents a victory for foreign and domestic
corporations looking to conduct business and receive fair trials in South Carolina.
One of the principal benefits of the new venue statute is its relative clarity and
specificity. Unlike the previous statute-which was fraught with ambiguity-the
amended statute provides straightforward bases for determining proper venue and
adequately defines all necessary terms. South Carolina courts can expect a
substantial decrease in litigation regarding venue issues in suits against corporate
defendants. Additionally; the unambiguous nature of the new venue statute should
greatly benefit corporate defendants. Not only will corporations save litigation
costs, but they can also operate their businesses in South Carolina without the
uncertainty-and fear--of being forced to litigate in distant and unfriendly courts.
Second, the recent changes to South Carolina's venue jurisprudence will
significantly reduce forum shopping by plaintiffs. Under the pre-2005 venue statute
and its subsequent interpretation, South Carolina amassed an embarrassing record
regarding venue selection in suits involving corporate defendants. Michael
Freedman, in an article for Forbes magazine, remarked, "Most states don't allow
this kind of forum shopping."'70 In particular, many tort reform proponents often
mention Hampton County as a mecca for forum shopping plaintiffs. The county
maintains a caseload nearly twice that of other counties with comparable
populations. 1 ' Assuredly, Hampton County's caseload is not merely the result of
an accident-prone population-non-resident plaintiffs file sixty-seven percent of
lawsuits in Hampton County, and forty-one percent of the cases involve events
occurring outside of the county's borders.'72
Fortunately, the new venue statute provides significant limitations on the
number of potential venues for a given action and thereby reduces forum shopping.
Now, both domestic and foreign corporations can anticipate suits only in counties
having a substantial connection to the underlying dispute or to the corporation
itself. Local courts and communities will also benefit from the narrower venue
standards because local citizens and courts will no longer have to bear the burden
of litigation unrelated to the local community. Plaintiff-friendly courts can expect
lighter caseloads, fewer cases having little or no connection to the locality, and,
therefore, easier access to crucial evidence. Overall, the reduction of forum
shopping will undoubtedly make civil litigation in South Carolina more efficient
for all interested parties.

170. Freedman, supra note 1, at 75.
171. Amicus Brief of Product Liability Council, supra note 8, at 6.
172. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note 7, at 21.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2006

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:465

Most importantly, the recent changes to corporate venue should promote
business development in South Carolina. South Carolina boasts the nation's sixth
highest unemployment rate, 17 3 and the Bureau of Economic Analysis ranked South
Carolina forty-third out of fifty states in per capita income. 174 In addition, the
United States Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform "ranked South
Carolina's liability system fortieth of the fifty states overall.' 75 Although the
previous venue laws certainly were not the only basis for South Carolina's stagnant
economy, they certainly did not encourage economic growth. Such negative
publicity alone is detrimental to the state's economy. And fear ofinconvenient fora
and excessive verdicts could influence foreign corporations to avoid South Carolina
completely, while domestic corporations may refuse to expand their existing
operations into other counties.'76
In particular, overly broad venue provisions are detrimental to the counties in
the greatest need of economic stimuli. For example, Hampton County "is the tenth
poorest of South Carolina's 46 counties"'17 7 and maintains an unemployment rate
of 7.8%, nearly 1.8% above the state average.' In 2000, Walmart developed plans
to open a retail facility in Hampton County but, following discussions with counsel,
scrapped its plans and never built at that location.' 79

The amended venue statute should diminish the concerns of foreign and
domestic corporations and help jump-start economic development throughout the
state. The state legislature enacted the new venue statute as part of the Economic
Development, Citizens, and Small Business Protection Act of 2005."' ° The title
alone implies that the South Carolina Legislature considered changes in the venue
law essential to the economic development of the state. The significant reduction
in forum shopping will increase corporate confidence in the state's judicial system
and should spark economic growth.'' Corporations will be able to develop new or
expand existing operations throughout South Carolina without fear of subjection
to an unjust judicial system. Consequently, foreign and domestic corporations are
not the only parties that stand to benefit from the recent amendments to corporate
venue. South Carolina workers can also look forward to betterjob opportunities and
a more stable economic environment.

173. Amicus Brief of ATRA, supranote 103, at 21 (citation omitted).
174. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, PERSONAL INCOME BY STATE AND REGION 2004-2005,
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2005/spi0905.xls (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
175. Amicus Brief of ATRA, supra note 103, at 23 (citation omitted).
176. See id. at 23-24 (quoting Cindi Ross Scoppe, Editorial, There's a Lot More to Tort Reform
than Arbitrary Caps (Thank Goodness), THE STATE, Sept. 23, 2003, at A8 ("[W]hen the fear of
litigation... starts affecting business decisions, it starts affecting our already-struggling economy.").
177. Freedman, supra note 1, at 76.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Economic Development, Citizens, and Small Business Protection Act of 2005, No. 27,
§§ 3-4, 2005 S.C. Acts 107 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-7-30 & -100 (Supp. 2005)).
181. Amicus Brief of Product Liability Council, supra note 8, at 25 (stating that jury shopping
"creates the impression that law and jurors can be manipulated to give unfair advantages to certain
parties").
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VII. CONCLUSION

The forum chosen for the adjudication of a cause of action can significantly
affect the outcome of the dispute and convenience of the parties. Unfortunately for
corporate defendants, South Carolina's pre-2005 venue statute and its broad judicial
interpretation allowed plaintiffs unfettered discretion to haul corporations into
burdensome, plaintiff-friendly courts. However, South Carolina's recent attempts
to "curb 'the abuses engendered by this extensive venue""'1 2 have met their mark.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Whaley overturned an erroneous
and overly-broad interpretation of the pre-2005 venue statute and protected
corporate defendants' right to be tried where they truly reside. More importantly,
the new venue statute effectively eliminates forum shopping and provides corporate
defendants with confidence to transact business freely throughout the state. South
Carolina's new venue jurisprudence should help stimulate the state's economy and
fulfill the true purpose of venue: promoting the convenience of all litigants.
Steven B. McFarland

182. Janutis, supra note 28, at 39 (quoting WRIGHT, supra note 31, § 3802).
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